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Resumen 
La aprobación presidencial en el Perú depende del estado de la economía. Sin 
embargo, los ciudadanos no son capaces de distinguir entre los resultados 
económicos determinados por las políticas económicas y aquellos que son 
consecuencia de choques externos. Los resultados de la estimación de siete 
modelos VAR Fraccionalmente Cointegrados (FCVAR) sugieren que la aprobación 
presidencial aumenta con la tasa de interés de política monetaria, los términos de 
intercambio y el empleo manufacturero; y disminuye con el tipo de cambio nominal 
PEN/USD y la volatilidad de la inflación. Adicionalmente, un Análisis de 
Componentes Principales (PCA) sobre un amplio conjunto de indicadores 
macroeconómicos sostiene que la influencia de los factores externos sobre la 
aprobación presidencial es mayor que la de los factores domésticos; ie., los 
resultados económicos que determinan la dinámica de la aprobación presidencial 
no están bajo el control del presidente en Perú. Esta es la primera aplicación del 
análisis de cointegración fraccional para el estudio de la economía política en 
América Latina, según el conocimiento del autor.  
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11 Introduction
Perus history of high-level corruption raises concerns about the e¤ectiveness of national democratic
governance in choosing the most qualied politicians. Although elected on the pledge to overturn
previous authoritarian practices, all Presidents since 2001 are currently under investigation for
allegations of accepting bribes from Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction company, in exchange for
support to win public sector tenders. According to a survey endorsed by Perus electoral authority1,
the average voter does not have a party a¢ liation and becomes concerned with politics only during
elections. Voters mainly care about whether a candidate is perceived as corrupt and, secondly,
about economic policies geared to reduce unemployment and poverty. The inuence of economic
performance on political approval creates a democratic mechanism whereby voters can promote
sound economic policies, as Presidents rarely implement policies that may damage their public
image. Along these lines, the economic voting approach suggests that political preferences respond
to changes in economic variables. However, the prevalence of information asymmetries and weak
institutions are arguments against the validity of economic voting in Peru and Latin America.
There is no agreement in the literature on whether voters consider economic performance in
making their choices. The determinants of political preferences change with time and across coun-
tries. Additionally, particular characteristics, such as persistent autocorrelation of political survey
data, make hypothesis testing di¢ cult and, therefore, papers about the same country di¤er in their
conclusions. Hence, more empirical research is required to verify the many theories that attempt to
explain votersbehavior. Towards this end, Byers, Davidson, and Peel (1997) model polling data
as an aggregation of persistent and temporary preferences (by committed and uncommitted voters,
respectively) that results in a fractional process. This paper presents evidence that some Peruvian
macroeconomic series, such as manufacturing employment, the policy rate of the Central Reserve
Bank of Peru (BCRP), and the terms of trade can be modeled as fractional processes. This set
of fractional time series allows estimation of Fractionally Cointegrated VAR (FCVAR) models to
assess the economic voting hypothesis econometrically. To the authorsbest knowledge, this is the
rst application of fractional cointegration analysis to political economy in Latin America.
Johansen and Nielsen (2012) develop the required estimation and inference framework for FC-
VAR models. As an extension of Johansens (1995) Cointegrated VAR (CVAR), FCVAR includes
the same inference capabilities: estimation of the cointegration vectors, if any; and hypothesis test-
ing, but under fractional orders of cointegration. In a signicant contribution to political science in
Canada, Jones, Nielsen, and Popiel (2014) use the FCVAR to show that political partiesapproval
ratings hold a long-run relationship with economic variables. They further reject the hypothesis of
approval ratings being weakly exogenous and dependent on the U.S. economy.
This paper nds that, in 2001-2018, presidential approval in Peru increased with the inter-
est rate, the terms of trade, and employment in the manufacturing sector; and decreased with
the nominal PEN/USD exchange rate, ination volatility, and corruption perception. Further-
more, presidential approval adjusts to changes in macroeconomic variables. In turn, interest rates
and external economic variables are weakly exogenous, as expected from discretionary monetary
policy and international markets, respectively. In the authorsview, this research contributes to
understanding the complex dynamics of political preferences in Peru. Additionally, a Principal
Components Analysis (PCA) points to a greater inuence of external over domestic factors in ex-
plaining presidential approval. According to current political economy thought, globalization blurs
1<observaigualdad.jne.gob.pe/pdfs/recursos/PERFIL_ELECTORAL_EN_EL_PERU.pdf >
2votersability to di¤erentiate between economic outcomes resulting from sound policies and those
caused by external shocks. Specically, this paper suggests that, due to reasons such as information
asymmetries and incipient regional integration in Latin America, presidential approval ratings in
Peru respond to economic performance that is primarly determined by exogenous factors such as
the behavior of commodity prices. This has implications for political accountability and poses a
challenge to Perus democratic governance. Altogether, economic variables are still signicant for
presidential approval .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical developments on the
determinants of voting behavior and arguments in favor of the validity of economic voting in Peru.
It also highlights the debate about the mechanism through which economic voting implies political
accountability. Section 3 presents the FCVAR methodology. Section 4 contains the empirical
analysis and discusses important ndings. Section 5 describes other estimation results. Section 6
concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Economic Voting and Political Accountability
Economic voting explains changes in political preferences as a response to varying economic condi-
tions. The literature provides evidence of economic voting for a vast number of countries. The rst
studies in this eld, such as Downs (1957), Fair (1978), and Kramer (1971), assume that voters
maximize their expected utility taking into account past economic performance. This means that
voters are rational and, despite information asymmetries and party a¢ liations, their decisions are
based on empirical data2. However, it is di¢ cult to reach an agreement on which variables should
be included in votersutility function due to inconclusive statistical results.
In Latin America, the literature outlines the particular characteristics of the political system
that facilitate economic voting. First, Roberts and Wibbels (1999) point out that the lack of
political party institutionalization causes weak ideological identication, which in turn fails to
stabilize political preferences in a changing economic context. Similarly, Ratto (2013) suggests
that political preferences are driven by two factors: a stable component (ideology) and a rather
volatile one (economic performance). For example, Chiles presidential approval during the last
12 years has remained high despite economic deceleration; see Perello (2015). One explanation
might be the importance of ideology and partisanship among left-leaning voters in Chile, as both
administrations in that period were of that persuasion. In the case of Peru, Osorio (2015) studies
Ollanta Humalas government and concludes that voters are driven by ideology only during elections
because of low partisanship. Weak political party institutionalization has two e¤ects in Peru. First,
voterspreferences are governed by elements such as leaderspersonality and communication skills.
As a result, Presidents tend to lose support a few months after being elected. Second, a lack of
voterscommitment makes their preferences unstable; i.e., basically short-term economic conditions
are considered when assessing the Presidents approval.
Further studies on the topic investigate how voters value economic performance. Voters need
a comparison reference to decide whether an economic outcome is good or bad. Traditionally,
political economy considers a temporal criterion; i.e., retrospective and prospective voting. Retro-
2For a comprehensive and detailed survey of the theoretical aspects of the political economy of dynamic elections,
see Duggan and Martinelli (2017).
3spective voters penalize bad decisions; i.e., they refresh their preferences according to past political
performance. Both Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) describe voting behavior as penalizing or
rewarding politicians by modeling a utility function including only past events. On the other hand,
prospective voting is aligned with rational expectations. According to this theory, individuals do
not make systematic mistakes and include every new piece of information available; see, for exam-
ple, Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988) and Cukierman and Meltzer (1989). For further information on the
ongoing discussion about this temporal dimension, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) and Duch
and Stevenson (2008). These authors highlight that the number of lags required in the model speci-
cation to avoid autocorrelation is also subject to debate: more lags are needed under retrospective
voting because political preferences are formed using information from many periods in the past. In
the case of Latin America, the structural reforms that established democracy also caused high un-
employment and ination. Although economic outcomes improved rapidly, the reelection of many
Presidents during that period raises questions about the validity of economic voting. Nevertheless,
Ratto (2013) nds empirical evidence in favor of economic voting and against theories suggesting
that uncertainty deprives voters of economic guidance in young democracies; and highlights that
economic voting works as a democracy-reinforcing mechanism; i.e., citizens re-elect Presidents pro-
vided that they act according to their interests. The fact that economic voting prevails in Latin
America means that voters are able to choose the best policymakers and punish bad ones for their
mistakes through democratic practice.
Voters also compare economic outcomes in a spatial dimension. Globalization poses a challenge
to economic voting, as economic outcomes can be caused by either domestic policies or the global
environment. Powell and Whittenn (1993) stress that clarity of responsibility plays a central role
in forming political sentiment; but in an economy exposed to external shocks, the relationship
between presidential approval and economic outcomes becomes weaker. Later studies interpret
external factors as a second comparative dimension for evaluating economic outcomes. First, in
case voters are able to discount exogenous factors, economic voting maintains its role as a demo-
cratic mechanism. Kayser and Peress (2012) show that voters benchmark the domestic economy
against an international baseline. Thus, voters do not penalize the President for bad economic
results when other countries are also experiencing poor economic performance. Although bench-
marking allows the identication of political responsibility, the authors argue that it occurs due to
pre-benchmarked information disseminated by the media, instead of a highly sophisticated voting
behavior. Therefore, it is to be expected that, as economic integration increases, comovements
between the domestic economy and its benchmark reduce approval responsiveness to economic per-
formance; see Kayser and Peress (2016). However, these studies were carried out in countries with
consolidated democracies, highly-educated voters, and regionally integrated economies; thus, their
conclusions are not necessarily valid in the Latin American political context. For example, Navia
and Osorio (2015) assert that presidential systems in Latin America tend to blame the executive
power for current economic context; nevertheless, voters cannot tell whether good economic results
are caused by domestic policies or external shocks.
Recent research in the region disregards international benchmarking in voting and outlines the
prevalence of information asymmetries. Campello and Zucco (2016) show that in a large subset
of Latin American countries, including Peru, presidential popularity and reelection prospects are
driven by exogenous factors (i.e., not controlled by politicians) such as commodity price behavior.
This nding negatively a¤ects political accountability in the region: Presidents who do not feel
responsible for the results of their policies tend to adopt a rent-seeking behavior. In addition, there
4is evidence that media scandals become more relevant in a context of bad economic performance.
In a cross-sectional study of 18 Latin American countries, Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo
(2014) argue that political accountability is conditioned by the state of the economy. Hence, the
regions exposure to volatile international markets reinforces political instability. Furthermore, even
though presidential approval responds to economic changes, the democratic mechanism promoted
by retrospective economic voting does not occur.
This paper provides empirical evidence that economic voting hypothesis is valid for Peru, con-
sistently with current literature; see Stokes (1996), Arce and Carrion (2010), Maldonado and Pi-
mentel (2013), and Osorio (2015). Peruvian voters are prone to punish political incumbents based
on short-term economic performance. Weak partisanship softens long-term factors such as ideology.
As mentioned, external inuence and uncertainty about its impact on voters should also be con-
sidered. In particular, the Peruvian economy has been exposed to external shocks since the 1990s
because of its export orientation. However, even though economic performance is actually deter-
mined to a considerable extent by the international markets (see Dancourt, 2017; and Rodriguez
et al., 2018), there is no evidence that voters are aware of it. Further research on these issues can
make a signicant contribution to political science.
2.2 Fractional Cointegration and Political Economy
Empirical research in political science describes economic voting using error correction models; i.e.,
political preferences adjust to changes in economic variables; see Brody and Page (1975) and Beck
(1991). The rst theoretical development using error correction modeling is Ostrom and Smith
(1992). According to these authors, voters are mainly concerned about quality of life outcomes,
which establishes a long-run relationship between political preferences and the economy. However,
ordinary and extraordinary political events deviate votersassessment about the economy. Extra-
ordinary events such as corruption scandals are included in the cointegration vectors because they
have a permanent e¤ect on public sentiment. Ordinary events and other exogenous deviations, on
the other hand, are corrected or mainstreamed through media coverage. Regarding the individual
series, the study strongly rejects the hypothesis that political approval is stationary and assumes it
is a unit root process. Later, Beck (1992) highlights that political approval series seem to behave
as stationary processes when assessing long periods, whereas a random walk o¤ers a better t for
short-term analysis. Modeling approval rating as a random walk implies that all past information
is already contained in the present, which is plausible for nancial series (e¢ cient market hypoth-
esis). However, it is questionable that presidential approval today is determined by, for instance,
two-year-old events. Lastly, since political economy argues that movements in economic outcomes
are reected in political support and not vice versa, the researcher must only assess the hypothesis
of political support being error-correcting.
Box-Ste¤ensmeier and Tomlinson (2000) explain the benets of modeling political support data
as fractional processes. According to the literature there are two kinds of voters. Committed voters
make rigorous decisions based on information from both the past and present. On the other hand,
less sophisticated respondents are driven by current impressions about political performance. The
aggregation of these series is best modeled as a fractional process. Fractional integration allows
for long memory in stationary time series. Additionally, a fractional cointegration framework does
not require parent series to be I(1) nor residuals to be stationary. From this more general notion
of cointegration, it is possible to a¢ rm that if parent and residual series are integrated of order
5(d) and (d0), respectively, where d  d0 < 0:5, then the two series are fractionally cointegrated; see
Dueker and Startz (1998).
Treisman (2011) models presidential approval as a fractional process to analyze extensively the
prevalence of economic factors over opinion manipulation in Russia. The pronounced di¤erence be-
tween Yeltsins and Putins popularity is attributed to the latters e¤ective political strategies. The
author estimates various fractionally integrated single equation models, including dummy variables
for high-impact events such as the occupation of Chechnya, the attack on Kosovo, and Yeltsins
illness; and a set of macroeconomic variables. The model shows that Putins higher popularity is
mainly correlated with improving economic conditions in Russia. In contrast, manipulation strate-
gies do not fulll their goals. Thus, the common long-run trend between presidential approval and
realized economic performance holds even under information uncertainty.
More recently, Jones, Nielsen, and Popiel (2014) show that Canadian prospective voters respond
to current macroeconomic conditions by using a FCVAR model. Since the FCVAR does not assume
any integration order for the political variable, it is expected to provide better estimates and more
precise inference. Using aggregated polling data, it shows that Canadas Liberal Party benets
from high unemployment and a low interest rate, whereas the Conservative Party gains support
in the opposite manner. It nds that political support and unemployment correct deviations from
equilibrium, while the interest rate is weakly exogenous. However, as mentioned in Beck (1992),
nding that unemployment is error-correcting might not be compatible with political economy
theory.
In conclusion, there is theoretical and empirical evidence that economic performance deter-
mines political preferences. However, since common estimation techniques are not able to incor-
porate the mixed behavior of political time series, empirical research on economic voting yields
inconclusive results. The fractional cointegration analysis o¤ers better tools to avoid model mis-
specication. Furthermore, it allows to describe the short-run dynamics between political and
economic variables.
This paper aims to show that presidential approval ratings hold a long-run relationship with
macroeconomic performance in Peru. It is worth highlighting that the analysis focuses on how,
and to what extent, macroeconomic variables drive political support for the current President (the
incumbent) and not on how voters choose from a set of candidates.
3 Methodology
This paper uses an FCVAR model to identify and assess the long-run relations between presidential
approval ratings and macroeconomic time series. The estimation and inference tools were developed
by Johansen (2008) and Johansen and Nielsen (2010, 2012, 2014). The FCVAR can be better
understood using the CVAR approach developed by Johansen (1995):
Yt = 
0Yt 1 +
kX
i=1
 iYt i + t, (1)
where Yt is a column vector of n variables,  and  are nr matrices, r is the number of cointegrating
vectors, and 0 < r < n. The r cointegrating vectors are included in each column of , which implies
that the long-run relationships are given by the elements of 0Yt. The coe¢ cients for the speed of
adjustment towards the equilibrium are contained in . Lastly,   represents the systems short-run
behavior.
6As shown in Johansen and Nielsen (2012) and Jones et al. (2014), the whole extension can be
illustrated by replacing  and L by their fractional counterparts b and Lb = 1 b = 1 (1 L)b:
bYt = 
0LbYt 1 +
kX
i=1
 iL
i
b
bYt + t: (2)
The FCVAR model (see Johansen, 2008), is derived after (2) is applied to Yt = d bXt:
dXt = 
0Lbd bXt 1 +
kX
i=1
 iL
i
b
dXt + t: (3)
Specically, Johansen and Nielsen (2014) consider the simplied case with d = b:
dXt = Ld(
0Xt 1 + 0) +
kX
i=1
 iL
i
d
dXt + t: (4)
Johansen and Nielsen (2012) point out that 0Xt+ 0 is a zero-mean process of fractional order
zero, where 0Xt has the same interpretation as equation (1). Note that since d1 = 0, Ld0 = 0.
The authors demonstrate that when 0 < r < n, Xt is fractional of order d and cofractional of order
d  b. This means that 0Xt is fractional of order d  b. Since fractional di¤erentiation is dened as
an innite time series, calculation under nite samples is not possible. It can be assumed that Xt
is zero before t = 1 to avoid this issue. However, according to Johansen and Nielsen (2014), this
assumption would introduce a bias that can be avoided by including a level parameter :
d(Xt   ) = Ld0(Xt   ) +
kX
i=1
 iL
i
d
d(Xt   ) + t: (5)
As mentioned before, FCVAR provides the same inference benets as CVAR. It includes a set
of tests to determine how many long-run relationships exist. Moreover, adjustment responses to
deviations from equilibrium and short-run behavior can be modeled and estimated. Lastly, it is
also possible to assess the model t by testing the residuals for serial correlation.
The hypotheses for the long-run coe¢ cients, , are given by  = H', where, given that s is
the number of freely varying parameters, H is an n s matrix that species the restrictions to be
tested and ' is an s  r matrix of freely varying parameters. When r = 1, that is, when there is
only one cointegrating relationship, the same restriction is imposed and the degrees of freedom of
the test are calculated as follows: df = (n  s)r. If r > 1, di¤erent restrictions can be imposed on
di¤erent columns of ; i.e.,  = (H1'1; : : : ;H2'2), where each Hi matrix is of dimensions n  si.
The degrees of freedom will in turn be df =
Pr
i=1(n  r   si + 1).
Analogously, the hypotheses on  are expressed as  = A , where, given that m is the number
of freely varying parameters, the known nm matrix A contains the restricted coe¢ cients for the
speed of adjusment. Lastly,  is an m r matrix of freely varying parameters with m  r and the
degrees of freedom of the test are df = (n m)r.
74 Empirical Analysis
This study uses a Matlab package provided by Nielsen and Popiel (2016). It allows the calculation
of estimated values and test statistics at each step of the FCVAR estimation. First, the number
of lags is chosen as a result of a general-to-specic procedure. Beginning from a high lag order
kmax to k = 0, the signicance of the highest-order lag coe¢ cient is tested. If it is not signicant,
it is dropped and the model is re-estimated. This procedure is repeated until the null hypothesis
is rejected. A Ljung-Box Q-test, Q^(h), for h = 12 lags, a serial correlation test, and information
criteria AIC and BIC are calculated at each step. Order k is selected so the error terms are not
correlated and the information criteria are minimum. Next, the FCVAR estimation procedure
under the simplied case with d = b described in the former section is carried out. Since a di¤erent
integration order is estimated for each model, the search for cointegrating vectors involves testing
many groups of variables.
The hypothesis tests are specied as follows: Hd1 tests d = 1; Hi tests whether the long-run
coe¢ cient of the ith variable in the model is not signicant (i = 0); and Hi tests for weak
exogeneity (i = 0). Seven models are constructed to test the economic voting hypothesis for Peru.
4.1 Data
Previous studies have been exible: there is no agreement on which economic variables should be
taken as explanatory of political support. Thus, a set of series of good indicators of macroeconomic
performance in Peru are combined. First, monetary policy controls inationary pressures by act-
ing in response to demand and supply shocks. Therefore, the interest rate contains information
about the general state of the economy. Second, local demand, unemployment, and manufactur-
ing employment represent domestic economic activity. Third, Perus economic exposure to external
shocks, including nominal exchange rates and terms of trade, is taken into account. Fourth, ination
volatility is considered to have a negative inuence on economic growth; see Judson and Orphanides
(1999). Therefore, a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model
is estimated to include ination volatility in the analysis. Fifth, after considering a large set of
macroeconomic indicators, a PCA is performed to summarize economic activity in a small number
of relevant factors. Finally, the Google Trends corruption index is included.
Presidential approval ratings are obtained from monthly national surveys conducted by IPSOS3
in August 2001-February 2018. This information is public and available online4. Next, monthly
macroeconomic time series for the same period are obtained from the Central Reserve Bank of Peru
(BCRP) website. Three groups of variables are distinguished: (i) domestic demand: manufacturing
employment; (ii) the BCRP monetary policy rate; and (iii) external variables: nominal exchange
rate (PEN/USD) and Perus terms of trade. All macroeconomic indicators are plotted in Figure
1. The recent economic history of Peru can be divided in a high-growth period, favorable terms
of trade, and currency appreciation (2002-2008); the aftermath of the global nancial crisis (2009);
and, nally, a period of weak output growth (2010-2018). In consequence, the sample analyzed is
deemed useful to avoid biased conclusions.
The political variable is rst converted to log-odds. Following Jones, Nielsen, and Popiel (2014),
the logit transformation of variables measured as percentages allows for unbounded error terms in
3 IPSOS is a well-known local polling agency.
4< www.ipsos.com/es-pe/news-and-polls/overview?page=0 >
8the models used. On the other hand, Figure 2a (solid red) indicates the presence of political cycles
in presidential approval ratings series. The period of study covers the administrations of Alejandro
Toledo, Alan García (his second term), Ollanta Humala, and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (his rst and
a half year in power). Each vertical line indicates election dates. As documented in the literature
(see Chappell and Keech, 1985; and Nielsen, 2014), there is a honeymooncharacterized by high
ratings at the beginning of each mandate, which smoothly decreases thereafter.
Actual ratings can be decomposed in a cyclical component (Ccyclet ) and a non-cyclical one (pat):
paactualt = C
cycle
t + pat: (6)
In order to account for both e¤ects, equation (6) is estimated using the following specication:
Ccyclet = 1 t + 2
2
t ; (7)
where  is the time since the last election measured in months. The term 2 is included to capture
changes in the political cycles e¤ect over time. Standard error terms are recovered to obtain the
ltered presidential approval series: pat. Both coe¢ cients estimated from equation (7), ^1 =  0:095
and ^2 = 0:001, are signicant at the 5% level. Moreover, R2 = 0:507 and the F test indicate that
the parameters are jointly signicant with 99% condence. The ltered presidential approval series
is shown in Figure 2a (dashed blue). Finally, Figure 2b shows the ltered presidential approval
series (dashed blue) and the corruption index in log-odds (solid red).
A univariate analysis is then done to show the appropriateness of the FCVAR framework. First,
Figure 3a shows that the autocorrelation function for the political variable decays hyperbolically.
This suggests that political preferences have a long memory: next months ratings are commonly
similar to current ones. Moreover, Figure 3b evidences the existence of a long-run stochastic trend,
since the spectral density plot is concentrated around the zero frequency.
Next, Table 1 shows the estimated integration orders, d^, and a Ljung-Box Q-test for each series
from the models univariate version, i.e. Fractional AR (FAR); see Jones, Nielsen, and Popiel
(2014). It is worth noting that in all variables, with the exception of ination volatility and
corruption perception, the estimated integration orders are fractional and serial correlation can be
avoided by using at most two lags. Ination volatility is fractional stationary; therefore, d^ is close
to zero. Additionally, FAR-estimated residuals for corruption perception are uncorrelated with
k = 3. Table 1 also shows that the integration orders estimated using Geweke and Porter-Hudak
(1983) with bandwidths m = T 0:5, m = T 0:6 and m = T 0:7are fractional and consistent with the
ones estimated using FAR estimates. Presidential approval ratings have a mixed behavior, since
d^ is fractional and increases with m. In sum, given the features of the analyzed time series, the
FCVAR model appears to be more suitable than the standard CVAR for avoiding misspecication
errors.
4.2 Model 1: Presidential Approval, Interest and Nominal Exchange Rates
A system including presidential approval, the interest rate, and the nominal PEN/USD exchange
rate is assessed initially. Table 2 presents the relevant results for the model. First, the lag selection
criterion determines k = 0. Next, rank tests start with the hypothesis r = 0, which is rejected
against r = 3. It is not possible to reject r = 1, since the corresponding p value = 0:919.
The model is estimated with k = 0 and r = 1. This results in an estimated integration order
d^ = 1:160 with standard error 0:042. Moreover, the Ljung-Box Q-test, Q"^(12), indicates that there
9is no sign of serial correlation in the residuals. The long-run relationship is normalized by assigning
a value of one to the coe¢ cient of the political variable (1 = 1). The estimated coe¢ cients for
the interest and nominal exchange rates are ^2 = 0:132 and ^3 =  4:801, respectively. The signs
of the coe¢ cients imply that political approval increases with the interest rate and decreases with
the nominal exchange rate.
As mentioned in Section 4, ination remained low during the period of analysis due to e¢ cient
ination targeting. Thus, high interest rates are a monetary policy response to positive demand
pressures and reect that the economy is doing well. By contrast, a nominal exchange rate depreci-
ation causes higher liability costs in Peru because of bank dollarization; see Dancourt (2017). The
fact that both variables hold a long-run relationship with presidential approval imply that they
determine a convergence towards political equilibrium. For example, negative exogenous shocks on
the model, such as political scandals, have a limited impact during appreciation periods because
presidential approval in equilibrium is high.
The appropriateness of the FCVAR approach is conrmed by rejecting Hd1 (16.367 with p value
= 0:000). The hypotheses H1 ,H2 , and H3 are rejected, indicating that all three variables enter in
the long-run relationship (p-values 0.000, 0.008, and 0.000, respectively). The H1 is also rejected
(19.107 with p-value 0.000), suggesting that the political variable is error-correcting (i.e., it adjusts
to changes in the long-run equilibrium). Changes in the interest and nominal exchange rates are
corrected through changes in presidential approval. The opposite occurs with the interest rate:
tests on  fail to reject H2 . The exogenous behavior of the interest rate is consistent with the fact
that it is xed in a discretionary manner by the monetary authority, so it does not move when the
other variables in the model change. On the other hand, nominal exchange rates are inuenced by
international currency markets and discretionary BCRP interventions. However, nominal exchange
rates do respond to interest rate changes through the interest rate parity; thus, H3 is borderline
rejected (p-value of 0.044).
Summing up, the interest rate is weakly exogenous, while both approval ratings and exchange
rates are error-correcting. All the tests are specied following (6) and (7), respectively, where
(p; s; r) = (3; 2; 1) and (p;m; r) = (3; 2; 1). The model is estimated again using 2 = 0 as a
restriction to account for the long-run exogeneity of the policy interest rate. The ^ coe¢ cients
change slightly but keep the same signs as in the unrestricted model.
Finally, the negative sign of the adjustment coe¢ cient for political approval may be interpreted
as follows: a 1% decrease in the interest rate is corrected by an increase in the error term of the
cointegration vector, t, to maintain the long-run equilibrium. Next, the increase in t is responded
by a decrease in presidential approval ( 0:218) that pushes the system back to equilibrium through
the error- correction mechanism. In other words, changes in economic variables result in deviations
of presidential approval from its long-run equilibrium (hereafter referred to as political equilibrium).
4.3 Model 2: Presidential Approval, Interest Rate and Terms of Trade
The second model includes the terms of trade and excludes the nominal exchange rate. The
general-to-specic estimation procedure indicates that this system does not require any lags, so
k = 0 is chosen. Table 3 shows the tests and the estimation results. First, the cointegration test
rejects the null hypothesis r = 0. The existence of one cointegration vector is selected, since it
is not possible to reject r = 1 (p value = 0:616). The estimation of the system with k = 0 and
r = 1 implies that d^ = 1:160 with standard error 0:041. The Ljung-Box-Q-test fails to reject the
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null hypothesis of no serial correlation (Q"^(12) = 125:730 with p value = 0:117). The estimated
coe¢ cients of the interest rate and the terms of trade are 0:180 and 1:584, respectively, both
statistically signicant. The interpretation for the interest rates positive e¤ect is the same as for
Model 1: e¤ective ination targeting by the BCRP establishes a link between high rates and good
macroeconomic outcomes. Next, Perus dependence on commodity and metal prices since 2002 has
been documented in the literature; see Dancourt (2017), Rodriguez et al. (2018). Increases in the
terms of trade correspond to positive external shocks; therefore, its positive coe¢ cient is plausible.
On the one hand, specifying the system as an FCVAR model produces an inference gain, since
Hd1 rejects d = 1 (16.659 with p value = 0:000). On the other hand, the specication tests (H1 )
indicate that the political variable enters the cointegration relation (12,335 with a p-value=0.000).
The interest rate and the terms of trade also enter the long-run relationship. FromH2 andH3 , both
the interest rate and the terms of trade turn out to be weakly exogenous (p-values of 0.954 and 0.308,
respectively); i.e., they are not error-correcting. As in the previous model, since the interest rate
is xed by the monetary authority and the terms of trade depend solely on international markets,
this result is reasonable. Changes in either the interest rate or the terms of trade are corrected by
changes in presidential approval because H1 is rejected (p value = 0:001 and ^1 =  0:194). The
model is re-estimated taking into account the restrictions 2 = 3 = 0. The parameters estimated
for the restricted model do not di¤er signicantly from the unrestricted ones. There is only a minor
decrease in the coe¢ cients estimated for the interest rate and the terms of trade. In addition, the
speed of adjustment of the political variable increases slightly (^1 =  0:196).
Lastly, Models 1 and 2 suggest that external shocks inuence political preferences through
exchange rates and the terms of trade, respectively. External inuence on presidential approval
has two major consequences. First, it might cause political ambiguity, as pointed out in Navia
and Osorio (2015) and Campello and Zucco (2016). Specically, a favorable international context
increases the long-run presidential approval equilibrium in Peru, regardless of the current presidents
ability to conduct domestic economic policies. Second, Ratto (2013) claims that the democratic
mechanism of economic voting is weakened by political ambiguity, as citizens can be rewarding bad
economic policies that go unperceived because of a favorable external shock.
4.4 Model 3: Presidential Approval, Interest Rate, and Manufacturing Employment
The next model combines presidential approval ratings, the policy interest rate, and manufacturing
employment. The results are shown in Table 4. According to Akaikes Information Criterion, the
best alternative needs k = 1. The cointegration rank test rejects r = 0, but a p value = 0:457
indicates that it is not possible to reject r = 1. The estimation of the model with k = 1 and r = 1
results in d^ = 1:152 with standard error 0:056. The absence of serial correlation is inferred from
Q"^(12) = 129:169 (p value = 0:081). The cointegration vector has a coe¢ cient of 0:339 for the
interest rate and 3:253 for employment. Manufacturing performance is a good indicator of overall
economic activity, as it has the second largest share in GDP after services. This result provides
grounds to suggest that approval ratings can also reach a long-run equilibrium with solely domestic
factors.
The CVAR framework is disregarded as a result of rejecting Hd1 (5.342 with p value = 0:021).
Additionally, specication tests conrm that the three variables enter the cointegration relationship
(see strong rejections for H1 ;H2 and H3 ). Weak exogeneity tests fail to reject H2 (1.822 with p-
value=0.177). As explained in previous subsections, the interest rates weak exogeneity is consistent
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with a discretionary monetary policy. Presidential approval is error-correcting (H1 is rejected with
a p value = 0:008). Moreover, the adjustment coe¢ cient of manufacturing employment is positive
(^3 = 0:003) and di¤erent from zero (H3 has a p value= 0:005). As an example, consider an increase
in the interest rate. This must be followed by a decrease in t in order to maintain the long-run
equilibrium. Therefore, in the short run, presidential approval increases because of its negative
adjustment coe¢ cient and pushes the system back to equilibrium. In contrast, ^3 > 0 reduces
manufacturing employment and moves the system away from equilibrium, which is plausible given
the negative impact of the interest rate on employment. A restricted model is estimated xing
2 = 0. In general, the parameters do not vary. Only the speed of adjustment of the political
variable increases considerably (from ^1 =  0:098 to ^1 =  0:131), whereas the coe¢ cient of the
interest rate decreased from 0.339 to 0.239. On the other hand, the absolute magnitudes of the
coe¢ cients for the speed of adjustment suggest that presidential approval responds to exogenous
shocks faster than to manufacturing employment.
Finally, it is important to highlight that the FCVAR approach shows an advantage over previous
studies for Peru, which failed to nd any signicant e¤ect of employment on presidential approval.
Stokes (1996) concludes that employment is negatively correlated with presidential approval by
using a multinomial logit model. First, an estimation bias can be introduced from not considering
endogeneity among explanatory variables. Second, the hypothesis testing results are debatable,
since autocorrelation in the political variable is rejected and its long memory behavior is not
considered. In contrast, FCVAR accounts for error correction dynamics and fractional orders of
integration, respectively. However, it cannot be discarded that analyzing a short period under
political reform explains the biased results. Additionally, Maldonado and Pimentel (2013) run an
OLS regression and come to the same conclusion. The problems arising from OLS estimation are
similar to the ones in Stokes (1996). However, the fact that this paper obtains robust opposite
results for the same period seems to conrm the estimation mistakes in those works. In conclusion,
there are two benets from estimating FCVAR Model 3 to analyze presidential approval. First,
it considers the long memory of the political support variables. Second, it allows studying the
dynamics of presidential approval over long periods, thereby avoiding biased results.
4.5 Model 4: Presidential Approval and Ination Volatility (Uncertainty)
The literature on economic voting suggests that high ination and political support are negatively
related; see Powell and Whitten (1993). Nevertheless, this hypothesis has been commonly proven
for hyperinationary economies; see for example Stokes (1996). In the case of Peru, it is not possible
to identify a long-run relationship between ination and the political variable during the period of
study using the FCVAR approach. A further examination of ination dynamics, in order to test
the economic voting hypothesis, implies estimating its volatility.
A GARCH model is estimated to obtain a measure of ination to gauge uncertainty. We
use monthly CPI ination from August 2000 to February 2018. First, the number of lags in the
mean equation is selected using both ination autocorrelation functions and Akaikes Information
Criterion. Only the lags that are signicant at the 5% level are included. LM autocorrelation
tests are then run over the squared residuals. The null hypothesis of non-serial autocorrelation is
rejected at the 5% level of signicance only for the rst lag (p value = 0:041). A GARCH (1,1)
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model is estimated, since it provides a better t; see Bollerslev (1986):
t = 0 + 1t 1 + 2t 5 + 3t 8 + 4t 12 + t, (8)
ht = + 1
2
t 1 + 1ht 1: (9)
Finally, the conditional variance estimates (h^t) are recovered and an additional FCVAR model
is estimated to assess the joint dynamics between ination volatility (uncertainty) and presidential
approval ratings.
The results from estimating Model 4, including presidential approval ratings and estimated
ination volatility, are shown in Table 5. First, the general-to-specic lag selection criterion con-
cludes 1 lag is needed. The rank test does not reject the hypothesis that there is 1 cointegration
relationship (p value = 0:385); therefore, Model 4 is estimated using k = 1 and r = 1.
The estimated integration order, d^, is 0:454 with standard error 0:084. Therefore, the p value of
the Ljung-Box Q-test is 0:586, which implies that the residuals are not serially correlated. On the
other hand, presidential approval decreases with ination volatility in the long run (its coe¢ cient
is  190:999). In other words, a permanent increase in ination volatility (uncertainty) of 100 basis
points would lead to a decrease in presidential approval ratings (included in log-odds) from, for
instance, 50% to 13%. Monetary theory states that high ination volatility negatively a¤ects the
real economy through investment uncertainty. For instance, Judson and Orphanides (1999) present
empirical evidence of the negative e¤ects of ination volatility on growth for a large cross-country
dataset. Moreover, they show that this negative correlation also holds during low-ination periods.
Ination uncertainty also incorporates media information about dramatic events. According to the
theory of political equilibrium developed by Ostrom and Smith (1992), it is plausible that ination
volatility (uncertainty) holds a long-run relationship with political support because it is a good
proxy for both ordinary and extraordinary events.
The hypothesis that d = 1 is strongly rejected (12.481 with p value = 0:000). Both variables
enter the cointegration vector, since H1 and H2 are rejected with 95% condence. H1 and H2
are also rejected, which means that the two variables respond to changes in political equilibrium.
Finally, the coe¢ cients for the speed of adjustment are ^1 =  0:079 and ^2 =  0:005, suggesting
that both variables are error-correcting and presidential approval adjusts faster to deviations from
the long-run equilibrium, since j^1j > j^2j. For example, consider a 100-basis-point increase in
ination volatility. This leads to an increase of 190:99 0:01 = 1:901 in ^t. As a consequence, pat
and 2t decrease by 1:901 0:079 =  0:150 and 1:901 0:005 =  0:001, respectively.
4.6 Model 5: Presidential Approval, Interest Rate, and Ination Volatility (Uncer-
tainty)
Table 6 contains the relevant estimation results for Model 5. The selection criteria indicate that
the system requires one lag. Next, the hypothesis r = 1 cannot be rejected, since the p value of the
rank test is 0:937. The estimated integration order is d^ = 0:732. Furthermore, the residuals are not
serially correlated, as the Ljung-Box Q tests p value = 0:364. From the estimated cointegration
vector, presidential approval increases with the interest rate (0:539) and decreases with ination
volatility ( 221:049). As asserted by previous models, a high interest rate is associated with positive
demand shocks in an economy under ination targeting, whereas ination volatility is a proxy for
uncertainty.
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The hypothesis that d = 1 is rejected (10.239 with p value = 0:001). Additionally, the tests
on the long-run coe¢ cients reject the null hypotheses, H1 and H3 , with p-values 0.014 and 0.000,
respectively; and the interest rate enters the relationship with a p-value of 0.023. The interest
rates signicance loss is to be expected, since its movements are mainly due to changes in ination
dynamics. If the interest rate is taken as a proxy for ination, the results are similar to Judson
and Orphanides (1993). They show that both ination and ination volatility are important for
growth, but the coe¢ cient for ination loses signicance when they are jointly estimated.
Next, the weak exogeneity tests fail to reject H2 (p value = 0:948), again because of discre-
tionary monetary policy. H1 and H3 are rejected with p-values of 0.009 and 0.000, respectively.
A correspondent restricted model is estimated with 2 = 0:000. The restricted model estimation
results in d^ = 0:732. First, residuals are serially uncorrelated (Q"^(12) = 112:617 with p value
= 0:361). Additionally, the estimated long-run coe¢ cients are barely distinct from the unrestricted
model. Finally, presidential approval and ination volatility are error-correcting, with the same
speed of adjustment as in the unrestricted model. As in Model 4, the faster adjustment in political
support implies that exogenous shocks have a greater impact on political support than on ination
volatility.
4.7 Model 6: Presidential Approval and Principal Components
This paper further considers a large dataset of macroeconomic variables containing information
about Perus overall economic performance. Pérez, Ghurra, and Grandez (2017) construct a lead-
ing indicator for the Peruvian economy by extracting a common factor from six variables: electricity
production, cement consumption, sales taxes, chicken sales, mining production, and monthly real
GDP. Moreover, since the leading indicator has a correlation of 0.853 with annual GDP growth,
the authors highlight its usefulness for forecasting purposes. Since this study is more concerned
about the current rather than the future state of the economy, a PCA is performed.
First, the variables used by Pérez, Ghurra, and Grandez (2017) are added to the ones from
our previous models: interest and nominal exchange rates, terms of trade, and manufacturing
employment. Next, the total variance of the bigger dataset is decomposed in 11 dimensions or
components (one per variable). An eigenvalue greater than 1 means that the factor in question
provides more information than the individual series, so components 1 and 2 (denoted by  1t
and  2t ) are kept. Figure 4 shows the ve highest eigenvalues. Moreover, components 1 and 2
represent 85.2% of the total variance. In other terms, it is possible to summarize Perus economic
performance in just two variables. Additionally, the share of each variables variance in the rst two
components is as follows: cement consumption, sales tax, chicken sales, electricity consumption,
and real GDP contribute around 12% each to dimension 1. Additionally, nominal exchange rates,
mineral production, and the terms of trade contribute 40%, 25%, and 11% to dimension 2. Finally,
Figure 5 plots components 1 and 2. Component 1 (solid red) contains information about domestic
demand indicators and follows the pattern of manufacturing employment, whereas the variables in
component 2 (dashed blue) are inuenced by external factors, mainly the terms of trade.
This paper further tests the economic voting hypothesis by estimating Model 6, which in-
cludes our political variable and components 1 and 2. If economic performance holds a long-run
relationship with presidential approval, the political variable must cointegrate with the principal
components of Perus economy. The estimation results for Model 6 are presented in Table 7. The
lag selection criterion suggests k = 3. The rst hypothesis, r = 0, cannot be rejected at the com-
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mon condence levels, since it has a p value = 0:157. However, as pointed out by Jones, Nielsen
and Popiel (2014), rank tests might have low power in small samples. Thus, it is possible to reject
r = 0 and continue with the estimation procedure. The model is estimated with k = 3 and r = 1,
given that the second rank test has a p value = 0:997. The estimated integration order is 1:191 as
a result of the rst components upward trend. Moreover, the Ljung-Box Q test on the residuals
concludes that there is no serial autocorrelation (p value = 0:943).
Specically, both long-run coe¢ cients are positive. Nevertheless, the coe¢ cient for the second
component, ^3 = 0:272, is almost three times the rst one (^2 = 0:092). Moreover, the coe¢ cients
for the speed of adjustment are all negative. The integration order is di¤erent from 1 (p-value of
0.010). It is possible to reject H1 , H2 , H3 , and H1 with 99% condence. Thus, the error-correcting
behavior of presidential approval is veried. However, H2 and H3 (p-values of 0.956 and 0.924,
respectively) are not rejected, implying that both principal components are weakly exogenous to
the system. This result should not raise concerns: Beck (1992) claims that cointegration analysis
must consider political science arguments in favor of economic exogeneity, as political preferences
respond to changes in the economy, but not vice versa. Moreover, since three lags are included,
it is important to note that the system takes one quarter to go back to equilibrium after a shock.
Estimation of the restricted model yields very similar results.
The inclusion of principal components in the system enriches the analysis of the long-run rela-
tionship, as they summarize the overall state of the economy. As mentioned before, component 1 is
obtained from the variance of domestic demand indicators; and component 2 is based on nominal
exchange rates, mineral production, and the terms of trade, which are indicators of external shocks
on Perus economy; see Dancourt (2017). The exercise shows that the external component may
have a greater impact in moving presidential approval away from its long-run equilibrium than the
domestic one. Following Campello and Zucco (2016), this nding suggests that Peruvian voters do
not compare economic outcomes with those in foreign countries, which is consistent with the lack
of political accountability and ambiguity explained in Model 2.
Kayser and Peress (2012) attribute political benchmarking to the medias e¤orts to disseminate
domestic economic news in comparison with developed countries. Thus, a possible explanation of
the absence of benchmarking in Peru is media preferences: they give greater coverage to exchange
rate movements and their inationary consequences than to domestic demand issues, such as the
job market. As asserted by Ostrom and Smith (1992), media coverage denes the relevance of
news in public sentiment. Additionally, Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo (2014) show that
political accountability is conditioned by the economy: media scandals are more relevant when the
economy is not going well. Thus, Perus exposure to volatile international markets could enhance
political instability. As an example, past corruption scandals emerged only under unfavorable
international contexts; i.e., when there is a need for political consensus and new economic policies.
More research is needed on the topic of information asymmetries through media coverage in Peru
and its implications for the political system.
4.8 Model 7: Introducing Corruption
Lastly, a corruption index is added to the variables in Model 2. Concerning the corruption indicator,
Google Trends is used to search for the word corruptionin Peru from January 2004 to February
2018. Google calculates relative popularity by dividing individual data by the total number of
searches in a location over a given period. These numbers are then scaled between 0 (the lowest
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interest recorded) and 100 (the highest). Thus, the higher the number of search results including
the word corruption, the higher the corruption perception and vice versa.
Table 8 shows the estimation results for Model 7. The lag selection criterion indicates k = 1.
Next, the cointegration rank test strongly rejects both r = 0 and r = 1, with p values 0:000
and 0:090, respectively. The model is estimated specifying k = 1 and two cointegrating vectors,
r = 2. Furthermore, the Ljung-Box test concludes that the residuals are uncorrelated. The rst
cointegrating vector excludes the terms of trade and the second one excludes the interest rate. As
expected, both cointegrating vectors prove that there is a strong negative long-run relationship
between presidential approval and corruption (^2 is  2:020 in the rst vector and  1:868 in the
second). At the same time, the estimated coe¢ cients for the interest rate and the terms of trade are
compatible with the magnitudes found in the former models: ^3 = 0:297 and ^4 = 1:443. Therefore,
they are given the same interpretation. In this case, the tests on the long run-coe¢ cients, , test
the hypothesis of the variable being excluded from the two cointegrating vectors. The hypothesis
of exclusion is then rejected for all variables; see the p-values for H1 , H2 , H3 and H4 in Table 8.
Analogously, the hypothesis of the variable being weakly exogenous in the two vectors is assessed
by testing . H1 , H2 and H3 (p-values of 0.001, 0.078 and 0.000, respectively) are rejected.
However, it is not possible to discard H4 , since it has a p value = 0:603. As explained before,
exogeneity of the terms of trade (4 = 0) is plausible, since they are determined by the international
markets. Presidential approval is error-correcting in both vectors, ^1 =  0:095 and  0:102. The
adjustment of the other variables is ambiguous. In the rst vector, corruption and the interest rate
deviate the system from equilibrium, while they are error-correcting in the second.
Corruption perception does respond to changes in both the economy and presidential approval.
For example, corruption scandals might go unperceived if the economy is doing well and the presi-
dents popularity is high. It can also be argued that there is more space in the media for political
and corruption scandals during good economic times. Thus, the response to corruption perception
pushes the system back or away from its equilibrium, depending on the context. Additionally,
the interest rate responds to uncertainty control in the same way as corruption perception. More
importantly, the estimation results make clear that economic variables do not lose signicance in
the cointegrating vector once corruption is included. Finally, these results are compatible with the
theory developed by Ostrom and Smith (1992). Corruption scandals enter the cointegrating vector
because they have a permanent e¤ect on presidential approval.
5 Other Estimation Results
As mentioned, there is no agreement on which variables enter votersutility function. Therefore,
di¤erent macroeconomic variables are combined as a proxy for overall wellbeing indicators. The
search of long-run relationships between the economy and presidential approval implies estimating
several models. Nevertheless, the cointegration relationship is not veried in all of them. The
estimation results in this section are available upon request.
First, monthly real GDP, both in levels and growth rates, is not signicant when explaining
presidential approval dynamics. As a possible explanation, these series may not be informative
about the general state of the economy due to publication delays; see Perez, Ghurra and Grandez
(2017). Specically, measuring aggregate production (GDP) is too complex (or debatable) a task
to be completed in a month without noticeable errors.
On the other hand, contrary to expectations, it was not possible to nd any cointegrating
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vector including presidential approval and ination. The estimation results suggest that the model
residuals are serially correlated whenever ination is included. The same occurs with the ination
expectations of both individuals and rms. However, Models 4 and 5 show that ination volatility
is signicant for presidential approval, indicating that ination uncertainty is the relevant variable.
The rank test indicates that there is a cointegrating vector including presidential approval, the
interest rate, and unemployment in Lima. Even though the estimated long-run unemployment
coe¢ cient is negative, as expected, it is not signicant. Unemployment in Peru is poorly estimated
as a consequence of high informal employment (about 70% of labor force). Thus, it is not a good
indicator of overall economic performance.
Finally, the HP lter is applied to obtain the secular component of the series used. As in the
case of CPI ination, it is not possible to nd any cointegrating vector and the estimated residuals
present strong serial correlation.
6 Conclusions
This paper aims to show that presidential approval ratings hold a long-run relationship with macro-
economic variables in Peru. To that end, seven FCVAR models containing both types of series are
estimated. Models 1 through 6 clearly show that the economic voting hypothesis holds for Peru in
2001-2018. Interest and nominal exchange rates, terms of trade, manufacturing employment, ina-
tion volatility and principal components are cointegrated with presidential approval ratings. In the
long run, presidential approval increases with the monetary policy interest rate, the terms of trade,
manufacturing employment, and principal components. Conversely, approval ratings decrease as
nominal exchange rates and ination volatility increase. Moreover, corruption perception shows a
negative relationship with presidential approval in Model 7. Additionally, economic variables do
not lose signicance when controlling for corruption perception: although there is a common belief
that presidential approval in Peru is driven only by corruption and media scandals, this evidence
is consistent with the economic voting theory. Lastly, the error-correcting behavior of the politi-
cal variable in all the models implies that presidential approval responds to changes in economic
performance.
The economic voting theory also states that the relationship between political and economic
variables works as a democratic mechanism. Voters are able to communicate their conformity or
dissatisfaction with the governments economic policies through presidential approval ratings; see
Ratto (2013). However, this paper nds that, as a consequence of external economic dependence,
presidential approval ratings in Peru are very responsive to changes in the international context.
Therefore, it is not possible to discard the existence of political ambiguity (i.e., high political
support due only to favorable external shocks) in Peru, as pointed out by Navia and Osorio (2015).
It is important to highlight that, according to Campello and Zucco (2016), lack of political ac-
countability encourages rent-seeking, one of the most important political issues in Latin America.
More research is needed on information asymmetries through media coverage and its implications
for Perus political system.
To the authorsbest knowledge, this is the rst application of fractional cointegration analysis
to political economy in Latin America. They hope the results of this research motivates political
science to use the FCVAR approach to explain the intricate dynamics of political support in the
region.
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7 Tables
Table 1. Univariate Analysis
GPH Estimates FAR(k) Estimates
m = T 0:5 m = T 0:6 m = T 0:7 k = 0 k = 1 k = 2
d^ d^ d^ d^ Q^ d^ Q^ d^ Q^
pat 0:863
(0:129)
0:611
(0:129)
0:900
(0:141)
0:941
(0:329)
21:473
(0:044)
0:793
(0:329)
18:484
(0:102)
0:795
(0:220)
18:949
(0:090)
lt 1:288
(0:073)
1:264
(0:061)
1:209
(0:048)
1:181
(0:047)
18:336
(0:106)
0:582
(0:029)
18:522
(0:101)
0:693
(0:046)
13:392
(0:807)
it 0:473
(0:245)
0:665
(0:148)
0:891
(0:120)
1:272
(0:066)
19:357
(0:008)
0:748
(0:082)
20:490
(0:058)
0:786
(0:151)
20:496
(0:059)
et 1:103
(0:225)
1:210
(0:184)
1:219
(0:133)
1:272
(0:066)
32:955
(0:001)
1:106
(0:125)
26:415
(0:009)
1:238
(0:103)
18:697
(0:096)
tott 0:879
(0:192)
0:890
(0:128)
0:999
(0:086)
1:120
(0:058)
9:972
(0:322)
1:100
(0:092)
10:189
(0:599)
0:392
(0:083)
10:325
(0:296)
2t 0:039
(0:181)
0:073
(0:139)
0:052
(0:107)
0:076
(0:064)
7:253
(0:840)
0:058
(0:113)
7:208
(0:844)
0:125
(0:158)
3:805
(0:987)
 1t 1:037
(0:045)
1:053
(0:028)
1:007
(0:021)
0:852
(0:043)
46:282
(0:000)
1:021
(0:044)
28:677
(0:004)
1:118
(0:045)
18:493
(0:102)
 2t 1:174
(0:239)
1:192
(0:163)
1:089
(0:112)
1:082
(0:055)
26:073
(0:010)
1:188
(0:067)
19:399
(0:079)
1:208
(0:075)
12:103
(0:437)
ct 0:898
(0:202)
0:691
(0:173)
0:294
(0:144)
0:378
(0:060)
30:514
(0:002)
0:396
(0:136)
30:827
(0:002)
0:587
(0:082)
27:530
(0:006)
GPH denotes Geweke and Porter-Hudak and FAR denotes fractional AR model. Ination
volatility (2t ) does not have long memory. Corruption perception (ct) estimates are based
on a smaller sample and its residuals are uncorrelated with k = 3.
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Table 2. FCVAR Results for Model 1
Presidential Approval Ratings, Interest and Nominal Exchange Rates
Rank Tests:
Rank d^ Log-Likelihood LR Statistic P value
0 1.090 517.800 38.154 0.035
1 1.160 532.955 7.843 0.919
2 1.183 536.333 1.088 0.978
3 1.187 536.877 - -
Unrestricted Model:
d
0BBB@
26664
pat
it
et
37775 
26664
 0:118
4:373
1:249
37775
1CCCA = Ld^
26664
 0:210
0:077
 0:005
37775 t + ^t
d^ = 1:160
(0:042)
; Q"^(12) = 126:544
(0:107)
; log(L) = 532:955
Equilibrium Relation:
pat = 5:429 + 0:132it   4:801et + t:
Hypothesis Tests:
Hd1 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LR 16.367 24.721 6.929 19.205 19.107 0.507 4.055
P value 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.476 0.044
Restricted Model:
d
0BBB@
26664
pat
it
et
37775 
26664
 0:169
4:381
1:248
37775
1CCCA = Ld
26664
 0:218
0:000
 0:005
37775 t + ^t
d^ = 1:158
(0:042)
; Q"^(12) = 125:750
(0:117)
; log(L) = 532:702
Equilibrium Relation:
pat = 5:222 + 0:112it   4:713et + t:
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Table 3. FCVAR Results for Model 2
Presidential Approval Ratings, Interest Rate and Terms of Trade
Rank Tests:
Rank d^ Log-Likelihood LR Statistic P value
0 1.117 426.470 35.697 0.072
1 1.160 438.626 11.385 0.616
2 1.162 444.201 0.235 1.000
3 1.164 444.319 - -
Unrestricted Model:
d
0BBB@
26664
pat
it
tott
37775 
26664
 0:282
5:887
4:050
37775
1CCCA = Ld^
26664
 0:194
0:005
0:005
37775 t + ^t
d^ = 1:160
(0:041)
; Q"^(12) = 125:730
(0:117)
; log(L) = 438:626
Equilibrium Relation:
pat =  7:757 + 0:180it + 1:584tott + t:
Hypothesis Tests:
Hd1 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LR 16.659 12.335 5.272 10.474 11.838 0.003 1.040
P value 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.001 0.001 0.954 0.308
Restricted Model:
d
0BBB@
26664
pat
it
tott
37775 
26664
 0:273
5:865
4:049
37775
1CCCA = Ld
26664
 0:196
0:000
0:000
37775 t + ^t
d^ = 1:161
(0:039)
; Q"^(12) = 128:629
(0:086)
; log(L) = 438:106
Equilibrium Relation:
pat =  7:007 + 0:152it + 1:443tott + t:
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Table 4. FCVAR Results for Model 3
Presidential Approval Ratings, Interest Rate and Industrial Employment
Rank Tests:
Rank d^ Log-Likelihood LR Statistic P value
0 1.128 702.905 43.045 0.011
1 1.152 717.929 12.996 0.457
2 1.195 724.389 0.077 1.000
3 1.197 724.428 - -
Unrestricted Model:
d
0BBB@
26664
pat
it
lt
37775 
26664
 0:054
5:681
4:311
37775
1CCCA = Ld^
26664
 0:098
0:070
0:003
37775 t +  ^d^Ld^(Xt   ^) + ^t
d^ = 1:152
(0:056)
; Q"^(12) = 129:169
(0:081)
; log(L) = 717:929
Equilibrium Relation:
pat =  16:004 + 0:339it + 3:253lt + t:
Hypothesis Tests:
Hd1 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LR 5.342 11.297 10.179 16.135 7.146 1.822 7.818
P value 0.021 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.177 0.005
Restricted Model:
d
0BBB@
26664
pat
it
lt
37775 
26664
 0:213
5:733
4:310
37775
1CCCA = Ld
26664
 0:131
0:000
0:004
37775 t +  ^d^Ld^(Xt   ^) + ^t
d^ = 1:134
(0:058)
; Q"^(12) = 128:811
(0:084)
; log(L) = 717:018
Equilibrium Relation:
pat =  15:517 + 0:239it + 3:233lt + t:
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Table 5. FCVAR Results for Model 4
Presidential Approval Ratings and Ination Volatility
Rank Tests:
Rank d^ Log-Likelihood LR Statistic P value
0 0.456 687.278 26.042 0.000
1 0.454 699.922 0.753 0.385
2 0.401 700.299 - -
Unrestricted Model:
d
0@24 pat
2t
35 
24  0:181
0:084
351A = Ld^
24  0:079
 0:005
35 t +  ^d^Ld^(Xt   ^) + ^t
d^ = 0:454
(0:084)
; Q"^(12) = 45:246
(0:586)
; log(L) = 699:922
Equilibrium Relation:
pat = 15:863  190:9992t + t:
Hypothesis Tests:
Hd1 H1 H2 H1 H2
df 1 1 1 1 1
LR 12.481 5.940 22.884 8.835 15.184
P value 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.003 0.000
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Table 6. FCVAR Results for Model 5
Presidential Approval Ratings, Interest Rate and Ination Volatility
Rank Tests:
Rank d^ Log-Likelihood LR Statistic P value
0 0.662 640.419 41.826 0.000
1 0.732 659.762 3.140 0.937
2 0.715 661.224 0.217 0.946
3 0.728 661.332 - -
Unrestricted Model:
d
0BBB@
26664
pat
it
2t
37775 
26664
 0:138
5:762
0:088
37775
1CCCA = Ld^
26664
 0:030
 0:001
 0:003
37775 t +  ^d^Ld^(Xt   ^) + ^t
d^ = 0:732
(0:061)
; Q"^(12) = 112:528
(0:364)
; log(L) = 659:762
Equilibrium Relation:
pat = 16:201 + 0:539it   221:0492t + t:
Hypothesis Tests:
Hd1 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LR 10.239 6.047 5.152 34.033 6.855 0.004 21.942
P value 0.001 0.014 0.023 0.000 0.009 0.948 0.000
Restricted Model:
d
0BBB@
26664
pat
it
2t
37775 
26664
 0:138
5:763
0:088
37775
1CCCA = Ld
26664
 0:030
0:000
 0:003
37775 t +  ^d^Ld^(Xt   ^) + ^t
d^ = 0:732
(0:061)
; Q"^(12) = 112:617
(0:361)
; log(L) = 659:760
Equilibrium Relation:
pat = 16:119 + 0:547it   220:5562t + t:
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Table 7. FCVAR Results for Model 6
Presidential Approval Ratings, Components 1 and 2
Rank Tests:
Rank d^ Log-Likelihood LR Statistic P value
0 1.151 173.366 32.616 0.157
1 1.191 187.054 5.241 0.997
2 1.147 189.052 1.244 0.956
3 1.154 189.674 - -
Unrestricted Model:
d
0BBB@
26664
pat
 1t
 2t
37775 
26664
 0:360
 5:111
0:290
37775
1CCCA = Ld^
26664
 0:264
 0:003
 0:004
37775 t + 3Pi=1 idLid(Xt   ^) + ^t
d^ = 1:191
(0:040)
; Q"^(12) = 85:794
(0:943)
; log(L) = 187:054
Equilibrium Relation:
pat = 0:031 + 0:092 
1
t + 0:272 
2
t + t:
Hypothesis Tests:
Hd1 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LR 6.606 19.723 9.698 13.770 10.241 0.003 0.009
P value 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.956 0.924
Restricted Model:
d
0BBB@
26664
pat
 1t
 2t
37775 
26664
 0:364
 5:111
0:291
37775
1CCCA = Ld
26664
 0:264
0:000
0:000
37775 t + 3Pi=1 idLid(Xt   ^) + ^t
d^ = 1:191
(0:040)
; Q"^(12) = 85:730
(0:944)
; log(L) = 187:047
Equilibrium Relation:
pat = 0:027 + 0:092 
1
t + 0:273 
2
t + t:
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Table 8. FCVAR Results for Model 7
Presidential Approval Ratings, Google Corruption Index, Interest Rate and Terms of Trade
Rank Tests:
Rank d^ Log-Likelihood LR Statistic P value
0 0.733 477.029 70.199 0.000
1 0.631 501.023 22.211 0.090
2 0.653 511.166 1.925 0.964
3 0.676 512.118 0.020 0.994
4 0.678 512.128 - -
Hypothesis Tests:
Hd1 H1 H2 H3 H4 H1 H2 H3 H4
df 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
LR 29.389 16.557 26.666 26.414 14.773 13.284 5.092 31.922 1.013
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.078 0.000 0.603
Restricted Model:
d
0BBBBBB@
26666664
pat
ct
it
tott
37777775 
26666664
 0:918
 0:236
2:599
4:252
37777775
1CCCCCCA = Ld
26666664
 0:095  0:102
0:041  0:237
0:354  0:529
0:000 0:000
37777775
24 v1t
v2t
35+  ^d^Ld^(Xt   ^) + ^t
d^ = 0:645
(0:043)
; Q"^(12) = 201:810
(0:299)
; log(L) = 510:659
Equilibrium Relation:
pat =  2:167  2:020ct + 0:297it + 1t:
pat =  7:495  1:868ct + 1:443tott + 2t:
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Figure 2a. President of Perus Approval Ratings (solid-red) and Filtered Series (dashed-blue)
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Figure 2b. Corruption Index (solid-red) and Approval Ratings (dashed-blue).
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Figure 3a. Autocorrelation Function for President of Perus Approval Ratings (Bartletts formula
for MA(q) 95% condence bands)
Figure 3b. Spectral density for President of Perus Approval Ratings (bandwith=0.0183)
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Figure 4. Eigenvalues of Principal Components
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